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Abstract 
 
In organizing production, many firms conduct bi-sourcing, i.e., acquiring the same set of 
inputs by both buying from external suppliers (outsourcing) and producing in component-
manufacturing subsidiries (insourcing). We show that, by adopting the bi-sourcing 
strategy, firms can use the in-house production to mitigate the holdup problem in 
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1 Introduction
In organizing production, a firm needs to decide whether to produce inter-
mediate inputs internally (insourcing) or purchase them from external sup-
pliers (outsourcing). While much emphasis has been placed on the growth of
outsourcing in business magazines and newspapers, an emerging interesting
arrangement is worth investigating. Many firms are acquiring the same set of
inputs by both purchasing from external suppliers and carrying out in-house
production in component-manufacturing subsidiaries. We call it bi-sourcing
as it contains both outsourcing and insourcing. Bi-sourcing has become a
widely-adopted business strategy.
Nokia provides one example. To ensure the supply of electronic compo-
nents for the production of mobile phones and networks, Nokia operates ten
manufacturing plants in nine countries to produce semiconductors, micro-
processors, memory devices, micro controllers and displays. However, Nokia
does not rely solely on insourcing. It purchases a large proportion of the
components from a global network of suppliers. For instance, in 2003, out-
sourcing covered an estimated 20-25% of Nokia’s mobile phone engines in
volume (Nokia, 2003).
The bi-sourcing of long-term maintenance by U.S. airlines provides an-
other example. It is reported that half of U.S. carriers’ heavy-overhaul work
is conducted by in-house mechanics, while the other half is now performed
by outside vendors in the U.S. and overseas, which is a big surge from less
than a third in 1990 (Carey and Frangos, 2005).
In recent years, with IT services gaining importance, business corpora-
tions have increasingly adopted a set of internal and external providers in the
global economy (Cohen and Young, 2006). For example, DuPont has cre-
ated what it calls a global IT alliance that blends services from more than ten
service providers and DuPont ’s own internal resources to meet the demands
of the business. Similarly, the accounts-payable process of GMS, a global
manufacturing and service firm, has in fifteen years moved from being highly
centralized and internal, to globally decentralized and internal, to globally
decentralized with a mix of internal and external resources.
Why do companies conduct bi-sourcing in the global economy? To answer
this question, we first look at the strength and weakness of insourcing and
outsourcing in a closed-economy model, from which we can understand how
bi-sourcing, as a combination of insourcing and outsourcing, may perform
better than both insourcing and outsourcing.
In outsourcing, the final good producer and the component manufacturer
retain ownership and control over assets for downstream and upstream pro-
duction separately. According to the property-rights theory of the firm, the
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ownership and control of assets by the component manufacturer can stimu-
late its incentive to make investments and improve productivity; however, it
also allows the component manufacturer to pose greater holdup threat to the
downstream firm. The component manufacturer may threaten not to deliver
the agreed amount of inputs with the agreed specifications at the agreed date,
which may bring to the downstream firm the risk of a halt to its production
but may allow the component manufacturer to capture a larger share of total
surplus. Corporations are clearly aware of this potential return and risk in
conducting outsourcing. For instance, Nokia finds that outsourcing enables
the company to obtain inputs produced with the state-of-the-art technol-
ogy and adds flexibility to its manufacturing activities. However, Nokia also
understands that outsourcing involves the risk that the timely delivery of
components and the quality, safety and other standards for the inputs may
not be guaranteed (Nokia, 2003).
Insourcing (with vertical integration of component manufacturing by the
final good producer or the firm) puts the assets for the two successive stages of
production under a common ownership. By owning and controlling the assets
for component manufacturing, the firm can effectively minimize the potential
risk of the holdup problem. Nonetheless, the component manufacturer, who
does not own any assets essential to producing the intermediate goods, has
lower incentives to make investments to enhance production efficiency than
she does in the case of outsourcing.
By conducting insourcing and outsourcing simultaneously, bi-sourcing
may not only help the firm add up the strengths of both strategies, but
also mitigate the weakness of either insourcing or outsourcing by employ-
ing cross threat in its negotiations with the internal and external suppliers.
In bargaining with the external supplier, the firm, with the internal supply
from the component-manufacturing subsidiary, can minimize the potential
efficiency losses from the holdup problem. In negotiating with the internal
supplier, the provision of inputs from the external supplier helps introduce
elements of competition into the integrated firm. If the internal supplier, as a
result of lack of incentives, cannot produce quality components with updated
technology, the firm can rely more on the external component manufacturer.
This forces the internal supplier to make relationship-specific investments to
improve productivity.
The example of Samsung provides a vivid illustration of how bi-sourcing
may improve efficiency as compared with insourcing. In October 2002, Sam-
sung started a fifth-generation LCD production line in Chonan, South Ko-
rea, which served as an internal supplier of the component. In May 2003,
Sumitomo Chemical invested 28 billion Japanese Yen to establish the sec-
ond color filter plant in Pyungtaek, South Korea and built up an additional
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fifth-generation LCD production line. Samsung acquires the LCD from both
its internal manufacturer in Chonan and the external supplier in Pyung-
taek. The existence of the external supplier effectively introduces competitive
pressures onto the internal supplier and forces the internal supplier to make
relation-specific investments and improve productivity. Hiromasa Yonekura,
the president of Sumitomo Chemicals, commented on Samsung’s strategy
that “they really press these departments to compete”.1
The choice of organizational forms also depends on the organizational
fixed costs. Both insourcing and outsourcing involve significant fixed costs.
As bi-sourcing contains both insourcing and outsourcing, it is expected to
incur the fixed costs of both insourcing and outsourcing, and thus have the
highest fixed costs among the three organizational forms. Our theory thus
predicts that only those firms with the highest productivity will adopt bi-
sourcing because their revenues are large enough to cover the extra organi-
zational fixed costs.
Our model is then extended to the global-economy setup that consists
of the high-waged North and the low-waged South. In addition to deciding
on the organizational form, the firm also chooses the location of component
suppliers. A firm with its headquarters in the North can locate both the
internal and external component suppliers in the North or in the South.
Alternatively, the firm can choose to locate internal and external suppliers
separately with one in the North and the other in the South.
What drives the location choice of the internal and external component
suppliers? We identify two factors. One is the cost difference effect. With the
lower wage in the South as compared with the North, the suppliers (both ex-
ternal and internal) enjoy cost advantage and make more investments, which
enhances production efficiency. The other factor is the balancing effect. The
strength of bi-sourcing lies in that the firm utilizes cross threat to minimize
the potential efficiency losses from the external supplier’s holdup problem
and from the internal supplier’s lack of incentive in making relationship-
specific investments. Specifically, the firm uses the investment of one sup-
plier to enhance its bargaining power in negotiating with the other supplier.
To maximize the effectiveness of cross threat, the firm does not want either
component maker to be too strong relative to the other one. For example,
when the internal supplier makes too much investment, it may suppress the
incentive of the external supplier to invest because the firm’s default option
in the bargaining is so powerful that it overwhelms the external supplier. In
1We are grateful to Ivan Png for providing this example. This case is based on "Sam-
sung Electronics Announces the Industry’s Largest 46 Inch TFT LCD for High Definition
of TVs" (Company Press Release, October 25th 2002) and "Sumitomo Chemical to Double
LCD Color Filter Capacity in Korea" (Company Press Release, May 12th 2003).
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the global economy, the firm can use the location choice of component sup-
pliers, say, locating overly strong (or weak) supplier in the disadvantageous
North (or the advantageous South), to help balance the relative bargaining
power of the internal and external suppliers so as to achieve an ideal cross
threat effect in negotiations.
The optimal bi-sourcing strategy is determined with the interplay of the
cost difference effect and the balancing effect. In many cases we have con-
sidered, locating both internal and external suppliers in the South yields
the highest production efficiency among all possible patterns of bi-sourcing
strategy. This is consistent with some of the recent trends in world trade
development such as the growing significance of vertical specialization and
intrafirm trade and the complementarity between foreign direct investments
and trade.
Our paper is related to a growing literature on the choice between in-
sourcing and outsourcing in the global economy. These studies make use of
recent advances in the economic theory of organizations such as transaction
costs economics (TCE), property-rights theory (PRT), principal-agent theory
(PA) and authority-delegation theory (ADT)2 to explain the growing vertical
disintegration of international production.3 Our paper is most closely related
to Antràs and Helpman (2004). They integrate the property-rights theory of
firm and the heterogeneity of firm productivity (Melitz (2003)) into a gen-
eral equilibrium model of international trade to study the choice between
insourcing and outsourcing in the global economy. However, in their paper
as well as related papers in this strand of literature, outsourcing and insourc-
ing are two distinct and separate modes of acquiring intermediate inputs. In
contrast, we focus on the emerging pattern of bi-sourcing and its structure
in the global economy, where insourcing and outsourcing are simultaneously
adopted by final good producers in various countries.
Our paper is also associated with the industrial organization literature
on second sourcing or dual sourcing, which includes Anton and Yao (1987),
Shepard (1987), Farrell and Gallini (1988), Riordan and Sappington (1989),
Dick (1990) and Kerschbamer and Tournas (2003). These papers study why
a buyer uses either two or more outside or inside sellers to supply the goods.
Their key insight lies in that introducing competition on the sellers’ side
2See Williamson (1975, 1985) for the TCE, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990) and Hart (1995) for the PRT, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) for the PA,
and Aghion and Tirole (1997) for the ADT.
3The papers include McLaren (1999), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2004, 2005), Puga
and Trefler (2002), Antràs (2003), Marin and Verdier (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004),
Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2005), Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005), etc.
See Antràs (2005) and Spencer (2005) for literature review.
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can constrain their opportunistic behavior and thus reduce the adverse effect
of informational disadvantage on the buyer’s side. Clearly, we differ from
the dual sourcing literature in that we are dealing with multiple suppliers
that include both internal and external ones rather than multiple internal
suppliers or multiple external suppliers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic
model setup. The benchmark case of a closed economy model is analyzed
in Section 3. In Section 4, we extend the benchmark model to the global
economy. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Basic Model Setup
We extend the framework of Antràs and Helpman (2004) to study bi-sourcing.
Consider an economy consisting of two sectors: a homogeneous good (X)
produced with the constant returns to scale technology and a continuum
of differentiated goods (Y ) produced with the increasing returns to scale
technology. There is a unit measure of consumers with the preference of the
representative consumer given by
U = X1−µY µ, Y =
·Z
ω∈Ω
y(ω)αdω
¸1/α
, 0 < α < 1 (1)
where µ represents the weight that the consumers put on the differentiated
goods, X is the consumption of the homogeneous good, y(ω) is the consump-
tion of variety ω of the differentiated goods Y , Y is the index of aggregate
consumption of differentiated goods and the set Ω represents the mass of
those goods. The elasticity of substitution between any two differentiated
goods is σ ≡ 1/(1− α) > 1. A higher value of σ (α) implies fiercer competi-
tion in the differentiated goods sector.
It is well known that the consumer preference of (1) leads to the inverse
demand function for each variety ω of the differentiated goods:
p(ω) =
µI
Y
µ
y(ω)
Y
¶α−1
(2)
where p(ω) is the price of variety ω and I denotes the consumers’ total expen-
diture. For a given supplier of variety ω, Y and I are treated as constants.
To produce any variety of the differentiated goods, two variety-specific
inputs, h(ω) and m(ω), are jointly required, which are referred to as head-
quarters service and manufactured component respectively. The production
of both inputs uses only one factor – labor. Each unit of h(ω) and m(ω)
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requires one unit of labor. In the closed-economy setting (Section 3), the
wage rate is assumed to be a constant w; but this assumption will be re-
laxed in the global-economy setting (Section 4). The production function
of differentiated good y(ω) is assumed to take the form of a Cobb-Douglas
function
y(ω) = θ
·
h(ω)
η
¸η ·m(ω)
1− η
¸1−η
, 0 < η < 1. (3)
where θ is a firm-specific productivity parameter, and η is a sector-specific
parameter regarding the intensity of headquarters service in the production
of differentiated good ω with a larger η indicating a higher intensity of head-
quarters service. Combined with (2), it yields the revenue
R = µIY −αθα
·
h
η
¸αη · m
1− η
¸α(1−η)
(4)
where the variety parameter ω is left out hereon as all the cases are symmet-
ric.
There are two kinds of producers: final good producers, who provide
variety-specific headquarters service (h), and component makers, who sup-
ply variety-specific manufactured component (m). We denote the final good
producers by H and the component makers by M. Every final good pro-
ducer organizes the production process, combining the headquarters service
and the manufactured component to make the differentiated good in terms
of the production function (3). The final good producer supplies the head-
quarters service by itself; and henceforth, the final good producer and the
headquarters are used interchangeably. In addition, it needs to arrange for
the supply of the manufactured component. In the closed-economy setting
(Section 3), the final good producer can set up a subsidiary making the com-
ponent in-house (called insourcing and denoted by I), or contract with an
external supplier for the manufactured component (called outsourcing and
denoted by O), or both (called bi-sourcing and denoted by B). In the global-
economy setting (Section 4), there is an additional location-choice decision
between the high-waged North and the low-waged South for the component
manufacturing.
The time line of the model is as follows. At time 0, the final good pro-
ducer makes the organizational and location choices. Ex ante investments in
input production, including manufactured component (m) and headquarters
service (h), are made at date 1. At date 2, m is supplied and combined with
h to make the final product.
As in Antràs and Helpman (2004), we consider a setting of incomplete
contracts. It is assumed that the precise nature of the required inputs is
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difficult to specify ex ante, and that, once revealed ex post, the nature of
the required inputs is still not verifiable by a third party. As a result, the
final good producer H and component supplier M cannot write enforceable
contracts that specify the purchase of intermediate inputs with certain qual-
itative and quantitative qualifications for a certain price. As in Antràs and
Helpman (2004), it is further assumed that the ex ante investments for input
production are not contractible and neither is the sales revenue. There is a
large literature regarding the informational assumptions needed for the con-
tractual incompleteness to exist. But in this paper we take the contractual
incompleteness as given and explore its impacts on the choice of the sourcing
strategies in the global economy.
Without an enforceable contract written ex ante, the final good producer
H and component supplier M bargain over the surplus value from trade
at date 2 after they make their own investments at date 1. Following the
property-rights theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990), and Hart (1995)), it is assumed that the bargaining takes place
in both outsourcing and insourcing and thus in all the three organizational
forms we examine. Nevertheless, as ownership arrangements over the assets
for component manufacturing confer the residual rights of control, the relative
bargaining powers betweenH andM vary from outsourcing to insourcing and
bi-sourcing, which will be elaborated further in Section 3.
3 Bi-Sourcing in the Closed Economy
In this section, we analyze the equilibrium in a closed-economy setting where
the production of both components and final goods is carried out in one
country. The decision to be made concerns only with the organizational
choice. The final good producers or the headquarters can choose to have
insourcing, or outsourcing, or bi-sourcing for the supply of components.
The three organizational forms differ from each other in terms of the fixed
organizational costs. In the case of outsourcing, the final good producer H
and component supplier M have arm’s-length trading relationship, bearing
market transactions costs such as the costs of H searching for a suitable
component manufacturerM , bargaining withM , and writing contracts with
M. In the case of insourcing, H and M are vertically integrated into one
firm. Though the market transactions costs per se may be reduced, H needs
to supervise M in the production process, incurring substantial monitoring
costs. Following Antràs and Helpman (2004), we assume that the fixed or-
ganizational costs of insourcing (denoted by fI) are higher than those of
outsourcing (denoted by fO). In the scenario of bi-sourcing, insourcing and
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outsourcing coexist, and the final good producer H needs to incur the fixed
costs associated with both insourcing and outsourcing. We thus expect that
bi-sourcing has the highest fixed organizational costs (denoted by fB) among
the three organizational forms. As a result, the fixed costs involved in the
three organizational forms observe the following order4
fB > fI > fO. (5)
The main difference among the three organizational forms, however, lies in
their impacts on the investment incentive for input production and conse-
quently the size of the trading surplus, which we turn to in the following
subsections.
3.1 Single Sourcing
In single sourcing, the final good producer H either signs a contract with
M to purchase the variety-specific component (i.e., single outsourcing) or
integrates withM to produce the component in-house (i.e., single insourcing).
Afterwards, H and M make investments to produce headquarters service h
and manufactured component m respectively. Then they bargain over the
distribution of the surplus from the trading relationship.
Notice that we follow the property-rights theory of the firm by assuming
that ex post bargaining still takes place even if H vertically integrates M ;
nevertheless, as compared with outsourcing, the final good producer H has
greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the component supplier M . This is be-
cause, in the case of insourcing, with ownership and control over the assets
for component manufacturing, H can always fire the component supplier af-
ter the input investment is made and still enjoy part of the input investment
so long as the original component supplier does not have some production
capability that is irreplaceable. For simplicity of analysis, we follow Antràs
and Helpman (2004) by assuming that the ex post bargaining process follows
a generalized Nash bargaining game where H has higher bargaining power in
single insoursing (denoted by βI ∈ (0, 1)) than in single outsourcing (denoted
by β ∈ (0, 1)), i.e., βI > β. Given that the headquarters service and man-
ufactured component are variety-specific, it is further assumed that neither
H nor M could get any value in case of bargaining failure.
Assume that the ex post bargaining is efficient. Then H andM will reach
an agreement on the division of surplus R at date 2. H gets βkR andM gets
4For convenience, the fixed costs (fI , fO and fB) are expressed in terms of units of
labor. We can obtain the monetary value of fixed costs by multiplying them by wage rate
w.
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(1−βk)R, where βk = β when k = O and βk = βI when k = I. At date 1, the
two parties choose to make investments in input production noncooperatively
to maximize their respective payoffs. More specifically, M and H choose m
and h to maximize (1 − βk)R − wm and βkR − wh respectively. The total
payoff of the two parties under single sourcing can be shown as follows:
πk = φk(µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α − wfk (6)
where
φk = α
α
1−αw−
α
1−α (βk)
α
1−αη(1− βk)
α
1−α (1−η)[1− α(βkη + (1− βk)(1− η))],
k ∈ {O, I} .
To save space, derivation of key equations and proof of all Lemmas and
Propositions are contained in the Appendix.
3.2 Bi-sourcing
The scenario of bi-sourcing is more complicated as the final good producer
H obtains the manufactured component from two suppliers – one internal
(denoted by M1) and one external (denoted by M2). The investments made
by the internal and external suppliers are denoted bym1 andm2, respectively.
We define some notations here first
R = µIY −αθα[hη ]
αη[m1+m2
1−η ]
α(1−η),
R1 = µIY −αθ
α[hη ]
αη[ m1
1−η ]
α(1−η),
R2 = µIY −αθ
α[hη ]
αη[ m2
1−η ]
α(1−η).
(7)
Expressions (7) denote the respective total revenues when both M1 and M2
supply the component, onlyM1 supplies the component and onlyM2 provides
the component. In negotiations, the total revenue available to the three
parties amounts to R, from which H needs to pay P1 to M1 and P2 to M2
respectively.
We consider a sequential bargaining process among the three parties.
After deciding to adopt bi-sourcing but before all three parties make any
investment, the final good producer H (also called the headquarters as it
supplies the headquarters service) may announce whether to negotiate with
the internal supplier M1 first and then the external supplier M2 or the other
way around.
Consider the case where the headquarters H first bargains with the inter-
nal supplier M1 and then with the external supplier M2.Using the backward
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induction approach, we first analyze the second stage – the negotiation be-
tween H and M2 – given that H has successfully concluded its negotiation
with M1, in which H pays P1 to M1 and retains R1 − P1 for itself.
In negotiating with M2, H expects to get R − P1 − P2 if the trading is
carried out but obtains the disagreement option value R1−P1 if negotiation
breaks down, whereas M2 obtains a transfer payment P2 from H if trading
is conducted and zero otherwise. Given that bargaining is efficient, H and
M2 reach an agreement on the division of the value of trade R − R1, with
the external supplier receiving
P ∗2 = (1− β)(R−R1) (8)
and H having R1 − P1 + β(R−R1).
Next we analyze the first stage – the negotiation between H and M1.
If there is trade with M1, H secures R − P1 − P ∗2 while if there is no trade
with M1, H is able to at least gain what he can reap from the scenario of
single outsourcing, i.e., βR2.5 Similarly, M1 gets P1 with trade and zero
otherwise. Thus the Nash bargaining yields a division of the value from
trade: R−P ∗2 − βR2 = R1+ β(R−R1)− βR2 between H and M1, with M1
receiving
P ∗1 = (1− βI)(R1 + β(R−R1)− βR2) (9)
and H has R− P ∗1 − P ∗2 .
Under the assumption of perfect foresight, H chooses h to maximize R−
P ∗1 − P ∗2 − wh = ββIR + βI(1− β)R1 + β(1− βI)R2 − wh, M1 chooses m1
to maximize (1− βI)[βR+ (1− β)R1 − βR2] −wm1, and M2 chooses m2 to
maximize(1 − β)(R − R1) − wm2. Solving these optimization problems, we
obtain the total payoff in this scenario of bi-sourcing as
πB = φB(µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α − wfB (10)
where
φB = α
α
1−αT
α
1−αη(1− β)
α
1−α (1−η)w
−α
1−α [1− α(ηT + (1− η)(1− β))],
T = ββI + (1− β)βI
µ
1
A
¶α(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
µ
1− 1
A
¶α(1−η)
,
A =
·
1 + ββI − 2β
(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
> 1.
5R − R1 collapses into R2 when the internal supplier M1 does not supply any manu-
factured component, i.e., m1 = 0, and consequently R1 − P1 + β(R − R1) collapses into
βR2.
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Using the same backward induction approach, we can analyze the case
where the headquarters H first negotiates with the external supplier M2
and then the internal supplier M1. But we can show that this sequence of
negotiation for bi-sourcing will collapse into single outsourcing. Specifically,
Lemma 1 If the headquarters H negotiates with the external supplier M2
before the internal supplier M1, the bi-sourcing scenario is reduced to the
single outsourcing case.
To put this result in perspective, we can analyze the marginal revenues
and marginal costs faced by M1 and M2. We know that the component
supplier who is negotiated later contributes to the total revenue on top of
the input made by the component supplier who is negotiated earlier. Given
the concavity of the revenue function, the second-to-negotiate-with supplier
always contributes less to the total revenue for a given amount of input
and in turn claims a lower marginal revenue than the first-to-negotiate-with
supplier does. Meanwhile, the external supplier has higher bargaining power
and thus claims a larger share of its marginal contribution than the internal
supplier does (i.e., 1−β > 1−βI). As a result, whenM2 is negotiated before
M1, M2 always gains a higher marginal revenue than M1 does. Since M2,
as the first mover, equates her marginal revenue with the constant marginal
cost (common wage rate w) in equilibrium, M1 will encounter a marginal
revenue that is always lower than the marginal cost, which will suppress
her incentive to make any investment. Consequently, only M2, the external
component supplier, will make investments to produce the component, which
reduces this case of bi-sourcing to single outsourcing.
Since the single sourcing cases have already been investigated in the lit-
erature such as Antràs and Helpman (2004), we will focus on the bi-sourcing
scenario where the headquarters negotiates with the internal supplier before
the external supplier.
3.3 When is Bi-Sourcing Adopted?
After obtaining the equilibrium payoffs in single insourcing, single outsourc-
ing and bi-sourcing, we want to know under what circumstances bi-sourcing
is chosen by the headquarters as the optimal organizational form.
As in the property-rights theory of the firm, it is assumed that there is
competitive supply of component makers ex ante and their outside option
can be taken care of through some ex ante transfer payments made by the
headquarters. Thus the condition for the headquarters to choose bi-sourcing
as the optimal organizational form is that the total payoff from trade is
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highest under bi-sourcing, i.e., πB > πI and πB > πO. It is clear from
equations (6) and (10) that the total payoff (πi) in any scenario is a linear
function of the measured productivity θ
α
1−α , and it just varies in the slope
and the intercept term from one organizational form to another. Since the
intercept terms are the negative of the fixed organization costs, it is easy
to compare their magnitude by resorting to the assumption in (5). We will
focus on the comparison of the slope term, φi, which can be interpreted as
indicating production efficiency.
As a first step, we need to compare the total payoff between single out-
sourcing and single insourcing, which was studied by Antràs (2003), and
Antràs and Helpman (2004).
Lemma 2 There exists a critical point η∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that when η > η∗,
φI > φO holds; and when η < η
∗, φI < φO holds.
The intuition of the results comes directly from the property-rights theory
of the firm. In our model, the headquarters (H) and the component supplier
(M) cooperate in the production process by providing complementary inputs
(h and m). In the production function (3), the factor intensity parameters
η and 1− η measure the importance of h and m in the cooperative relation-
ship. When η is large so that η > η∗ holds, the headquarters’ investment
is more important to the production process than the component supplier
does. In order to encourage the headquarters to invest, it is optimal to give
more ownership and control rights to the headquarters. Hence insourcing
(integration of component manufacturing by the headquarters) turns out to
be better than outsourcing. When η is small enough so that η < η∗, the
component supplier plays a more important role in the cooperative relation-
ship than the headquarters does. As a result, the component supplier should
be given more ownership and control rights, and outsourcing becomes more
efficient than insourcing.
Now we know the relative optimality between insourcing and outsourcing
(i.e., Lemma 2). To find out if bi-sourcing will be chosen as the optimal
organizational form, we only need to compare φB with φI in the headquarters-
intensive industry (where η > η∗) and compare φB with φO in the component-
intensive industry (where η < η∗).
3.3.1 The headquarters-intensive industry
First let us look at the headquarters-intensive industry, in which φI > φO
applies. Comparing φI of (6) and φB of (10), we can show that there exists a
η∗∗ ≥ η∗ such that for all η > η∗∗, φB > φI holds. We thus have the following
result:
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Lemma 3 φB > φI holds when η is sufficiently high (specifically, η > η∗∗).
From Lemma 3, we know that the production efficiency is the highest un-
der bi-sourcing, followed by insourcing and outsourcing in the headquarters-
intensive industries ( η > η∗∗). But from (5), we know that the fixed cost
for bi-sourcing is the highest, followed by insourcing and then outsourcing.
Together, we have:
Proposition 1 In the headquarters-intensive industry, the firms with high
productivity adopt the bi-sourcing strategy, the firms with low productivity
adopt the single outsourcing strategy and those intermediate firms choose the
single insourcing strategy.
The results of Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 make intuitive sense. Given the
Cobb-Douglas production function specified in equation (3), the provision of
headquarters service is important in the headquarters-intensive industry. To
encourage the provision of more headquarters service, we need to give the
headquarters larger bargaining power and more incentive. In the bi-sourcing
scenario, the headquarters has larger bargaining power than she does in single
insourcing or outsourcing. This is because, bargaining with both the internal
and the external suppliers, the headquarters can make use of the cross threat
to strengthen her bargaining power. Specifically, in bargaining with the
external supplier, the headquarters can have the in-house production as its
default option. Compared with the single outsourcing scenario where the
headquarters has zero default option value, the bi-sourcing scenario clearly
puts the headquarters at a more advantageous position and mitigates the
hold-up threat of the external supplier. Similarly, in negotiating with the
internal supplier, the headquarters can effectively curb the problem of lack
of incentives on the part of the internal supplier by threatening to resort
more to the external supplier if the internal supplier does not perform up
to expectation. Hence, in contrast with the single sourcing strategies, bi-
sourcing gives the headquarters a larger share of the total trading surplus and
thus higher incentive to produce headquarters service (h), which is crucial
in the headquarters-intensive industry. However, bi-sourcing involves the
highest fixed organizational costs, and only those firms with productivity
lying in the highest interval are able to afford the fixed cost and adopt bi-
sourcing.
Similarly, the choice between insourcing and outsourcing also hinges on
the comparison of production efficiency and fixed organizational costs. Al-
though insourcing achieves a higher production efficiency than outsourcing
does (φI > φO) in the headquarters-intensive industry, insourcing also bears
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a higher fixed organizational cost. That is why only those firms with reason-
ably high productivity will be able to adopt single insourcing strategy.
3.3.2 The component-intensive industry
In the component-intensive industry where η < η∗ and φI < φO, single
insourcing is dominated by single outsourcing because, compared with out-
sourcing, insourcing has both higher fixed organization cost (fI > fO) and
lower production efficiency (φI < φO). We thus only need to compare single
outsourcing and bi-sourcing to see when bi-sourcing will be chosen in the
component-intensive industry. Comparing φO of (6) and φB of (10), we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 4 In the component-intensive industry where η < η∗ and φI <
φO, φB > φO always holds.
Combining Lemma 4 with equation (5), we have the following conclusion.
Proposition 2 In the component-intensive industry (i.e., η < η∗), the firms
with high productivity adopt the bi-sourcing strategy while those with low pro-
ductivity adopt the single outsourcing strategy.
Intuitively in the component-intensive industry, the contribution of an in-
crease in manufactured component to the total output is particularly large.
It can be shown that bi-sourcing generates a larger total amount of manufac-
tured component than single outsourcing does. Why is this the case? On the
one hand, compared with outsourcing, bi-sourcing that combines integration
with outsourcing can mitigate the holdup problem in contracting with the
external supplier; but on the other hand it also reduces the incentive of the
external supplier as the latter’s share of ownership and control over the as-
sets for component manufacturing has diminished. Fortunately it turns out
that the internal component supplier has sufficiently large incentive for com-
ponent production so as to overcome the negative effect of the diminishing
incentive of the external supplier. Moreover, with the reduction in the holdup
problem, the headquarters has more incentive to make investment for head-
quarters service under bi-sourcing than under outsourcing. Both the internal
and external component suppliers gain from the increase in the headquarters
service owing to the complementarity of inputs in the cooperative production
process. As a consequence, the total supply of manufactured component has
further increased.
To summarize, we have shown that the bi-sourcing strategy yields the
highest production efficiency in both the headquarters-intensive industry and
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the component-intensive industry. This, combined with the difference in the
fixed organizational costs leads to the result that the higher-productivity
firms adopt the bi-sourcing strategy because only those firms can overcome
the extra fixed cost and enjoy the benefit of lower variable cost in the bi-
sourcing scenario.
4 Bi-sourcing in the Global Economy
Now we turn to the open-economy case. Suppose that the world consists
of two countries – the high-waged North and the low-waged South. Let
wN denote the wage rate in the North and wS denote the wage rate in the
South where t ≡ wNwS > 1. For simplicity of analysis, it is assumed that
the headquarters service (h) can only be produced in the North with one
unit of labor generating one unit of h, whereas the manufactured component
(m) can be produced either in the North or in the South with one unit of
labor producing one unit of m in either location. It is further assumed that
the relative bargaining power between the headquarters and the suppliers
remains constant across the locations (See Grossman, Helpman and Szeidle
(2004) for making the same assumption.)
In the open-economy case, the headquarters needs to make both location
and organization choices. There are altogether eight possibilities: (i) Single
insourcing in the North, (ii) single outsourcing in the North, (iii) bi-sourcing
in the North, (iv) single insourcing in the South, (v) single outsourcing in the
South, (vi) bi-sourcing in the South, (vii) bi-sourcing with insourcing in the
North and outsourcing in the South, and (viii) bi-sourcing with insourcing
in the South and outsourcing in the North. The comparison of (i), (ii)
and (iii) is just like what we had in the closed-economy setting, and the
same is true for the comparison of (iv), (v), and (vi). The intuition we get
from the closed-economy setting is that bi-sourcing has higher production
efficiency but involves higher fixed cost, and so it is the high-productivity
firms that choose bi-sourcing in both the headquarters-intensive industry
or the components-intensive industry. Meanwhile, the comparison of single
sourcing strategies in the global economy, i.e., (i), (ii), (iv) and (v), has
been studied in the literature (see Antràs and Helpman, 2004). Thus, in this
section, we would like to focus on the bi-sourcing strategies in the global
economy, i.e., (iii), (vi), (vii), and (viii). For ease of exposition, we come up
with simple notations for the four possible bi-sourcing cases, both insourcing
and outsourcing in the North by NN , both insourcing and outsourcing in the
South by SS, insourcing in the North and outsourcing in the South by NS,
and insourcing in the South and outsourcing in the North by SN , with the
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first letter denoting the location of insourcing and the second letter denoting
the location of outsourcing.
As in the closed-economy setting, the choice among the four bi-sourcing
arrangements depends on the interplay between the organizational fixed cost
and the production efficiency. One may argue that even the four bi-sourcing
arrangements could involve different organizational fixed costs. From the
analysis in the closed-economy setting, however, we know that the organiza-
tional fixed costs have predictable impacts on the organizational choice (the
higher-productivity firms versus lower-productivity firms arguments). Thus
in this section we would like to focus on the production efficiency as the key
criterion for the optimal bi-sourcing strategy. Indeed, the insights from the
property-rights theory of the firm are about the impacts of organizational
choice on the investment incentive and production efficiency.
In what follows, we first compare NN with SS to illustrate the impact of
the difference in wage rate between the North and the South — the cost differ-
ence effect (Section 4.1). Next, in Section 4.2, we compare SN , NS, and SS
to highlight how the location choice affects the relative bargaining power of
the external and internal suppliers and consequently their investment incen-
tive — the balancing effect. Both the cost difference effect and the balancing
effect are crucial to the production efficiency of bi-sourcing strategies in the
open-economy setting. Optimal bi-sourcing strategies will be derived for the
case of strong internal supplier and weak external supplier (Section 4.3), and
for the case of weak internal supplier and strong external supplier (Section
4.4). Before embarking on the analysis, we list the first-order conditions for
the headquarters, the internal supplier and the external supplier respectively



αµIY −αθα[hη ]
αη−1[m1+m2
1−η ]
α(1−η)T (x) = wN
α(1− βI)µIY −αθα[hη ]αη{β[m1+m21−η ]α(1−η)−1 + (1− β)[ m11−η ]α(1−η)−1} = wi
α(1− β)µIY −αθα[hη ]αη[
m1+m2
1−η ]
α(1−η)−1 = wi
(11)
where i ∈ {N,S}, T (x) = ββI + (1− β)βI (x)α(1−η) + β(1− βI)(1− x)α(1−η)
and x = m1m1+m2 . Here x is the ratio of manufactured component made by the
internal supplier. It reflects the relative contribution or bargaining power of
the internal and external suppliers to the total output and total profits, and
it will play an important role in the following analysis and discussion.
4.1 Comparing NN and SS: the Cost Difference Effect
We begin with the comparison between NN and SS. As both the internal
and external suppliers in these two strategies are located in the same country,
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it allows us to explore the impact of the difference in wage rate between the
South and the North (or the cost difference effect).
We can derive the total payoffs under NN and SS strategies as:
πNN = φNN(µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α − wNfNN (12)
where
φNN = α
α
1−αT
α
1−αη(1− β)
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α [1− α(ηT + (1− η)(1− β))]
T = ββI + (1− β)βI
µ
1
A
¶α(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
µ
1− 1
A
¶α(1−η)
A =
·
1 + ββI − 2β
(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
and
πSS = φSS(µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α − wNfSS (13)
where
φSS = α
α
1−αT
α
1−αη[t(1− β)]
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α [1− α(ηT + (1− η)(1− β))]
and T and A are defined as in (12).
Dividing φNN by φSS, we obtain
φNN
φSS
= t
−α
1−α (1−η) < 1 (14)
This inequality holds because t > 1. The result of φNN < φSS shows clearly
that the cost advantage of the South over the North enhances the production
efficiency when both the internal and the external suppliers are located in
the South. We thus derive the following conclusion.
Proposition 3 As the wage rate in the South is lower than that in the
North, putting both component suppliers in the South (SS) gains a higher
production efficiency than putting both in the North (NN).
The case of SS is quite similar to that of NN , except that both the inter-
nal and external suppliers in SS have lower marginal cost due to the lower
wage rate in the South. It follows that the suppliers in SS have stronger in-
centive to invest than those in NN , which leads to more component supply.
This in turn induces the headquarters to increase the supply of headquarters
service due to the complementarity effect in production, which further in-
creases the incentive of the component suppliers to invest. This chain effect
leads to a higher level of production efficiency in SS than in NN .
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4.2 Comparing SS, NS, and SN : the Balancing Effect
Next we compare SS, NS and SN , with the aim of examining how the
location choice for the bi-sourcing strategy affects the relative bargaining
power of the external and internal suppliers and consequently their invest-
ment incentive — henceforth called the balancing effect. We first derive the
production efficiency (φ) under NS and SN as
φNS = α
α
1−α (TNS)
α
1−αη[t(1−β)] α1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α
·
1− α(ηTNS + (1− η)(1− β)
µ
t+B − 1
B
¶¸
(15)
where
TNS = ββI + (1− β)βI
µ
1
B
¶α(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
µ
1− 1
B
¶α(1−η)
B =
·
t(1− β)− β(1− βI)
(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
> 1
and
φSN = α
α
1−α (TSN)
α
1−αη(1−β)
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α
·
1− α
µ
ηT + (1− η)(1− β)tC − t+ 1
tC
¶¸
(16)
where
TSN = ββI + (1− β)βI
µ
1
C
¶α(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
µ
1− 1
C
¶α(1−η)
C =
·
(1− β)− tβ(1− βI)
t(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
> 1
It is noteworthy that in order to have the SN case, the wage difference be-
tween the South and the North cannot be too large, i.e., t < 1−β
1−βI
, otherwise
the SN case collapses to single insourcing in the South.
Comparing (13), (15) and (16), we find that T, TNS and TSN share the
same functional form T (x) of (11), where x equals 1A ,
1
B and
1
C for T, T
NS
and TSN respectively. Recall that x is the ratio of manufactured component
made by the internal supplier, reflecting the relative bargaining power or
the relative contribution of the internal supplier versus the external supplier
to the total output and payoff. As shown in (13), (15) and (16), x can be
adjusted by the location choice of the bi-sourcing strategy.
Differentiating T (x) with respect to x, we can obtain the optimal x∗ that
maximizes T as
x∗ = x(βI , β, α, η). (17)
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We call x∗ as the ideal x achieving the optimal balancing of the relative
bargaining power between the internal and external suppliers. When x < x∗,
T is increasing in x; when x > x∗, T is decreasing in x.
When x∗ = 1A , then SS achieves the optimal balancing effect. Note also
that SS has larger cost advantages than NN,NS and SN do. Together, we
can show that SS has higher production efficiency than NS and SN do.
Proposition 4 When locating both the internal and external suppliers in
the South achieves the optimal balancing effect (i.e., x∗ = 1A), then SS has
higher production efficiency than NS or SN do.
Substituting x∗ = 1A into (17), we can obtain an optimal level of β
∗
I :
β∗I = f(β, α, η). (18)
When βI < β
∗
I ,
1
A > x
∗; and when βI > β
∗
I ,
1
A < x
∗.
It can be shown that 1B <
1
A <
1
C . When βI < β
∗
I ,
1
C >
1
A > x
∗ holds
and SN (corresponding to 1C ) is clearly inferior to SS (corresponding to
1
A)
in terms of the balancing effect. However, NS (corresponding to 1B ) may
allow the headquarters to achieve a more satisfactory balancing effect than
SS. When the reverse situation occurs, i.e., βI > β
∗
I , we have x
∗ > 1A >
1
B ,
which means that NS is inferior to SS. But it is likely that the SN scenario
may enable the headquarters to achieve a better balancing effect than SS as
1
C is larger than
1
A and is likely to be closer to x
∗.
The intuition goes like this. When βI is sufficiently low (or βI < β
∗
I ,
henceforth called “strong internal supplier and weak external supplier” as
will be analyzed in Section 4.3), the internal supplier has very high incentive
to produce component. This could pose such a big threat to the external
supplier in her bilateral negotiation with the headquarters that the external
supplier’s investments in component manufacturing would be deterred, which
in turn weakens the headquarters’ bargaining power in negotiation with the
internal supplier. This destroys the balance of the relative bargaining power
between the internal and the external suppliers. To correct this imbalance,
the headquarters can move insourcing to the North so as to force the internal
supplier to bear a high labor cost, reducing its incentive for component pro-
duction and thus mitigating its threat to the external supplier. Conversely,
when βI is sufficiently high (or βI > β
∗
I , henceforth called “strong exter-
nal supplier and weak internal supplier” as will be analyzed in Section 4.4),
the internal supplier has rather weak bargaining power, while the external
supplier becomes too powerful. To balance the relative bargaining power be-
tween the internal and external suppliers, the headquarters can weaken the
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strength of the external supplier by locating it in the North to bear a high
labor cost.
In summary, it is the consideration of the balancing effect that may
prompt the headquarters to separately locate the internal and external sup-
pliers.
4.3 Strong Internal Supplier and Weak External Sup-
plier
The analysis of Section 4.2 suggests that, under the circumstance of strong
internal supplier and weak external supplier (i.e., βI < β
∗
I), SS has a higher
level of production efficiency than SN for the former is better than the latter
in terms of both the cost difference effect and the balancing effect. Thus
in this scenario we only need to compare NS with SS to find out which
bi-sourcing arrangement has the highest production efficiency.
Start from the situation that the difference in wage rates between the
North and the South is quite small (i.e., t is close to 1) . If the headquarters
moves insourcing to the North, it will generate two positive and one negative
effects on the component production. On the positive side, firstly, the relative
bargaining power of the internal supplier is whittled down and that of the
headquarters is improved. As a result, the headquarters will supply more
headquarters service, which in turn stimulates the supply of manufactured
component. Secondly, it will transfer much of the component supply from
insourcing to outsourcing. Since the external supplier has higher incentive
and lower cost than the internal supplier does, this transfer may enhance the
total component supply. On the negative side, the production of the internal
supplier will be largely reduced as it faces a high labor cost. Overall, the
positive factors dominate the the negative one, leading the total component
supply to increase following the location shift of the internal supplier from
the South to the North.
When the wage rate difference (i.e. t) increases, it may further reduce
the relative bargaining power of the internal supplier and improve that of
the headquarters, which causes the total component production to increase.
The continuous increase in t will eventually reach a point where the head-
quarters attains the most satisfactory balancing effect, i.e., x∗ = 1B . Beyond
that point, the increase in the wage rate difference will reverse the relative
situation of the two suppliers, i.e., the internal supplier becomes too weak
and the external supplier becomes too powerful, which is unfavorable to the
headquarters. Under such a situation, transferring insourcing from the North
to the South (from NS to SS) will enhance the relative bargaining power of
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the internal supplier, which will in turn improve the headquarters’ strength
in negotiating with the external supplier and increase its incentive to provide
the headquarters service. Moreover, the investment on component produc-
tion from the internal supplier will increase as it now faces a low labor input
cost. So, the location shift of the internal supplier from the North to the
South will result in more supply of both the component and the headquar-
ters service, and thus produces a higher production efficiency under SS than
under NS.
From the above analysis, we have the following result.
Proposition 5 In the case of strong internal supplier and weak external
supplier (i.e., βI < β
∗
I): (i) locating insourcing in the North and outsourcing
in the South (NS) generates the highest production efficiency so long as the
wage difference between the two countries is small; (ii) otherwise, locating
both insourcing and outsourcing in the South yields the highest production
efficiency.
4.4 Weak Internal Supplier and Strong External Sup-
plier
Under this circumstance, since the internal supplier has too weak bargaining
power relative to the external supplier, moving the internal supplier from the
South to the North (or moving from SS to NS) cannot help balance the
relative bargaining power between the two suppliers. In addition, NS has a
cost disadvantage as compared with SS. Thus NS is clearly dominated by
SS, and we will focus on the comparison between SN and SS to find out
which bi-sourcing arrangement has the highest production efficiency.
Since the internal supplier is too weak, moving outsourcing to the North
(i.e., moving from SS to SN) will diminish the relative bargaining power
of the external supplier and increase that of the internal supplier. This en-
hances the incentive of the internal supplier to invest, which in turn improves
the bargaining strength of the headquarters and increases the provision of
headquarters service. However, there also exists a negative effect. The ex-
ternal supplier will reduce its investment as it loses its cost advantage and
bears a high labor cost in going from SS to SN. So the net effect on the
total component production depends on two competing forces. On the one
hand, the increase in the provision of headquarters service will boost com-
ponent production by both the internal and external suppliers; on the other
hand, the changing incentive structure causes the external supplier to lower
component production but the internal supplier to raise. It turns out that
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the increase in the investment by the internal supplier can hardly cover the
large drop in the investment by the external supplier. Even in the situation
with low wage difference, transferring outsourcing to the North is inferior to
putting both suppliers in the South in terms of component manufacturing.
In equilibrium, the latter negative effect dominates the former positive effect.
When the wage difference increases, the situation becomes even worse
as the drop in the external supplier’s component production exceeds the
increment in the internal supplier’s component production to a larger and
larger degree. The further increase in the wage difference will finally either
drive out the external supplier reducing SN to single insourcing in the South.
We therefore have the following conclusion.
Proposition 6 In the case of weak internal supplier and strong external
supplier (i.e., βI > β
∗
I), locating both suppliers in the South generates the
highest production efficiency regardless of wage difference between the South
and the North.
4.5 Some Implications for World Trade Pattern
Our study of bi-sourcing in the global economy can help us understand not
only the organizational and location choices of multinational enterprises in
carrying out bi-sourcing but also some of the new trends in international trade
in recent decades. Three aspects of world trade pattern are noteworthy.
Firstly, vertical specialization is shown to have made important contri-
butions to the spectacular growth in world trade. Since the early 1960s, the
share of global manufacturing export in world GDP has risen by a factor
of 3.4 (World Trade Organization, 2000). However, the world tariffs have
dropped by only 11 percent during this period, which can hardly account
fully for the trade explosion. Some studies show that vertical specialization,
i.e., the increasing interconnections of production processes in a sequential
and vertical trading chain stretching across many countries with each country
specializing in particular stages of a good’s production sequence, has grown
about 30 percent and accounts for about one-third of the growth in trade in
the last 20-30 years (Hummels, Rapoport and Yi, 1998; Hummels, Ishii and
Yi, 2001; Yi, 2003).
Secondly, intrafirm trade becomes a significant component of world trade.
It is reported that around one third of world trade is within-firm trade
(Antràs, 2003). It is also estimated that intrafirm trade accounted for more
than one third of US exports of goods and for more than two fifths of US
imports of goods (Zeile, 1997).
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Lastly, there is growing evidence on the complementarity between foreign
direct investment and trade. Eaton and Tamura (1994) find that, for Japan
and the US, there is a large and positive relationship between outward FDI
and imports as well as exports. Fontagne and Pajot (1997) report that one
dollar of US investment abroad is associated with $2.6 and $2.3 additional,
bilateral exports and imports within industries respectively. Similarly, each
one dollar of the US FDI stock abroad is associated with an additional bi-
lateral imports and exports of 1.3 dollars and 70 cents respectively.
According to our analysis, locating both internal and external suppliers
in the South (SS) is oftentimes the optimal bi-sourcing strategy adopted by
the multinational enterprise in our model. This strategy involves intrafirm
cross-border trade (mainly imports of components) between the headquar-
ters and the internal supplier; it also contains the headquarters’ imports of
intermediate goods from the external supplier. Clearly, the existence of the
SS bi-sourcing strategy with internal and external component suppliers lo-
cated in the South contributes to the growth in vertical specialization and
intrafirm trade, which in turn constitute significant sources of world trade
growth.
The SS case of bi-sourcing strategy also bundles together foreign direct
investment and international trade. By insourcing from an internal com-
ponent manufacturer on the foreign soil (the South), the SS bi-sourcing
strategy involves foreign direct investment. By outsourcing from a foreign
external supplier, it also contains trade in, particularly imports of, intermedi-
ate goods. The emergence of the SS bi-sourcing strategy clearly contributes
to the complementarity between foreign direct investment and international
trade.
Moreover, in our model, the relative strength index x = m1m1+m2 reflects
the proportion of intrafirm trade between the headquarters and the internal
supplier (m1) in total intermediate goods trade (m1+ m2). In our frame-
work, it can be used to approximate the share of intrafirm trade in total
trade. We can easily see that the x is increasing in the relative importance
of the headquarters service in total output and revenue functions (η), that
is, ∂x∂η > 0. This implies that the intrafirm trade will account for a larger
proportion of international trade in more headquarters-intensive industries.
This is consistent with one stylized fact – US intrafirm trade is heavily
concentrated in capital-intensive industries (Antràs, 2003) because US-based
multinational enterprises usually place capital-intensive production at home
while move labor-intensive industries to the low-waged South.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we extend the framework of Antràs and Helpman (2004) to
study the growing business strategy of bi-sourcing, that is, firms adopt in-
sourcing and outsourcing simultaneously in acquiring the same intermediate
inputs. We show that in conducting bi-sourcing firms can take advantage
of the cross threat effect in trilateral negotiation to mitigate the inherent
problems of both insourcing and outsourcing. On the one hand, the firm
can use the internal component supplier as a default option to minimize the
potential efficiency losses from the holdup problem of the external supplier.
On the other hand, the external supplier as an alternative source of compo-
nent provision can force the internal supplier to make relationship-specific
investments and improve productivity, which mitigates the lack of incentive
problem on the part of the internal supplier. Given that bi-sourcing contains
the fixed costs of both insourcing and outsourcing, our model predicts that
only the most productive firms will be able to adopt bi-sourcing strategy.
When multinational enterprises conduct bi-sourcing in the global econ-
omy, they choose the location of internal and external suppliers, i.e., in the
high-waged North or low-waged South. We identify two factors. One is the
cost difference between the North and South, and the other is the balancing
effect between the internal and external suppliers. Our analysis shows that
locating both suppliers in the low-cost South is most likely to be chosen for its
highest production efficiency. In addition, multinational enterprises may also
choose to locate the internal supplier in the North and the external supplier
in the South to achieve an optimal balancing effect. We demonstrate that
our results are consistent with some important facts in world trade pattern,
and they help us understand the growing importance of vertical specializa-
tion, intrafirm trade and complementarity between trade and foreign direct
investments.
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Appendix
Derivation of (6)
As M chooses an amount of m to maximize (1 − βk)R − wm and H
provides an amount of headquarters service h to maximize βkR − wh, the
first order conditions for the profit maximization problems are(
α(1− βk)µIY −αθα[hη ]αη[
m
1−η ]
α(1−η)−1 = w
αβkµIY
−αθα[hη ]
αη−1[ m
1−η ]
α(1−η) = w
which yields the equilibrium value of the two inputs as(
hk = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α (βk)
α
1−αη+1(1− βk)
α
1−α (1−η)w−
α
1−α
mk = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α (βk)
α
1−αη(1− βk)
α
1−α (1−η)+1w−
α
1−α
The total profits are calculated as
πk = R− whk − wmk − wfk
= α
α
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α (βk)
α
1−αη(1− βk)
α
1−α (1−η)w−
α
1−α [1− α(βkη
+(1− βk)(1− η))]− wfk
= φk(µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α − wfk
which gives Equation (6).
Derivation of (10)
The first order conditions for the headquarters (H), the internal supplier
(M1) and the external supplier (M2) are



w = αµIY −αθα
h
h
η
iαη−1½
ββI
h
m1+m2
1−η
iα(1−η)
+ (1− β)βI
h
m1
1−η
iα(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
h
m2
1−η
iα(1−η)¾
w = α(1− βI)µIY −αθα
h
h
η
iαη½
β
h
m1+m2
1−η
iα(1−η)−1
+ (1− β)
h
m1
1−η
iα(1−η)−1¾
w = α(1− β)µIY −αθα
h
h
η
iαη h
m1+m2
1−η
iα(1−η)−1
(19)
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Dividing the second equation by the last one, we get
(1− β)
·
m1 +m2
1− η
¸α(1−η)−1
= (1− βI)β
·
m1 +m2
1− η
¸α(1−η)−1
+(1− β)(1− βI)
·
m1
1− η
¸α(1−η)−1
⇒
m1 +m2
m1
=
·
1 + ββI − 2β
(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
≡ A > 1 (20)
and m2 = (A− 1)m1.
Substitute (20) back into (19), we get



w = αµIY −αθα
h
h
η
iαη−1 h
m1+m2
1−η
iα(1−η)
[ββI + (1− β)βIA−α(1−η)
+β(1− βI)
¡
A−1
A
¢α(1−η)
]
w = α(1− β)µIY −αθα
h
h
η
iαη h
m1+m2
1−η
iα(1−η)−1
(21)
Divide the second equation by the first one, we can get
h
η
m1+m2
1−η
=
T
S
where
T = ββI + (1− β)βIA−α(1−η) + β(1− βI)
µ
A− 1
A
¶α(1−η)
S = 1− β
Denote hη = Ta and
m1+m2
1−η = Sa and substitute into (21), we can derive
a = α
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−αT
α
1−αηS
α
1−α (1−η)w
−1
1−α
⇒



hB = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−αT
α
1−αη+1S
α
1−α (1−η)w
−1
1−α
m1B =
(1−η)
A α
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−αT
α
1−αηS
α
1−α (1−η)+1w
−1
1−α
m2B =
(1−η)(A−1)
A α
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−αT
α
1−αηS
α
1−α (1−η)+1w
−1
1−α
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Thus we can derive the profit as
πB = R− whB − wm1B − wm2B − wfB
= α
α
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−αT
α
1−αη(1− β) α1−α (1−η)w
−α
1−α [1−
α(ηT + (1− η)(1− β))]− wfB
= φB(µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α − wfB
which gives Equation (10).
Proof of Lemma 1
When H negotiates withM2 beforeM1, by the symmetry of the bargain-
ing game, we can write out the profit functions for the three parties (H, M1
and M2) as



πh = R− P1 − P2 = ββIR+ βI(1− β)R1 + β(1− βI)R2 − wh
π1 = P1 − wm1 = (1− βI)(R−R2)− wm1
π2 = P2 − wm2 = (1− β)[βIR+ (1− βI)R2 − βIR1]− wm2
The first order conditions of the suppliers are derived as
∂π1
∂m1
= α(1− βI)µIY −αθα
·
h
η
¸αη ·m1 +m2
1− η
¸α(1−η)−1
− w
∂π2
∂m2
= α(1− β)µIY −αθα
·
h
η
¸αη
{βI
·
m1 +m2
1− η
¸α(1−η)−1
+
(1− βI)
·
m2
1− η
¸α(1−η)−1
}− w
First, we have βI
h
m1+m2
1−η
iα(1−η)−1
+(1−βI)
h
m2
1−η
iα(1−η)−1
>
h
m1+m2
1−η
iα(1−η)−1
,
that is, for the last unit of investment, the external supplier’s contribution
to the total revenue is higher than the internal supplier’s.
Second, the external supplier has a larger Nash bargaining power than
the internal supplier does, i.e. 1 − β > 1 − βI , which means the external
supplier may claim a larger share of her contribution to the total revenue
than the internal supplier does. Based on these two results, we conclude
that ∂π2∂m2 >
∂π1
∂m1
.
As the external supplier maximizes her profits, she will make investments
m2 up to the point of ∂π2∂m2 = 0. As a result, at the optimum, we have
∂π2
∂m2
= 0 >
∂π1
∂m1
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Given that M1 makes investments m1 after M2 does and M2 invests m2 up
to a level corresponding to ∂π2∂m2 = 0, any investment made by M1 will have
a negative marginal profit. As a consequence, the internal supplier will have
no incentive to make any investment as its share of the total revenue cannot
cover its costs of investments.
Proof of Lemma 2
From (6), we find that φO and φI have similar functional form except that
they have different values of β and βI with βI > β.
Replacing βk by δ, we can rewrite φk as
φ(η; δ) = α
α
1−α δ
α
1−αη(1− δ) α1−α (1−η)w− α1−α [1− α(δη + (1− δ)(1− η))]
We get
∂φ(η; δ)
∂η
= φ(η; δ)
·
α
1− α ln δ −
α
1− α ln(1− δ)−
α(2δ − 1)
1− αδη − α(1− δ)(1− η)
¸
> φ(η; δ)
α
1− α [ln δ − ln(1− δ)− (2δ − 1)]
∂2φ(η; δ)
∂η2
> 0
Let ∆(δ) = ln δ − ln(1 − δ) − (2δ − 1), we see ∆0(δ) = 1δ +
1
1−δ − 2 > 0.
Thus, when 1
2
≤ β < βI , we have
∂φI
∂η ,
∂φO
∂η ≥
∂φ(η; 1
2
)
∂η > 0. When β < βI <
1
2
,
we have ∂φ(η;δ)∂η < φ(η; δ)
α
1−αδxη−α(1−δ)(1−η) [ln δ − ln(1 − δ) − (2δ − 1)] < 0,
which leads to ∂φO∂η ,
∂φI
∂η < 0. While β <
1
2
< βI , we have
∂φO
∂η < 0 <
∂φI
∂η .
As η → 1, φ(η; δ) → φ(1; δ) = α
α
1−α δ
α
1−αw−
α
1−α [1 − αδ]. Since ∂φ(1;δ)∂δ =
α
α
1−αw−
α
1−α δ
α
1−α−1 α
1−α(1− δ) > 0, we have φI > φO as βI > β. When η → 0,
φ(η; δ)→ φ(0; δ) = α α1−α (1−δ) α1−αw− α1−α [1−α(1−δ)] = α α1−α ξ α1−αw− α1−α [1−
αξ], where ξ ≡ 1−δ. Thus we have φI < φO since φ0(ξ) = α
α
1−αw−
α
1−α ξ
α
1−α−1 α
1−α(1−
ξ) > 0 and ξI = 1− βI < 1− β = ξ.
Given that φ(η; δ) is continuous and monotonic in η, we conclude from
the above inequalities that there must exist a trade-off point η∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that when η > η∗, φI > φO holds and when η < η
∗, φI < φO follows.
Proof of Lemma 3
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We first show that T is an increasing function of η. Denote y = αη − α
∂T
∂η
=
∂y
∂η
[(1− β)βIA
y
1+y
1
(1 + y)2
lnA− (1− βI)β(1−A
−1
1+y )−y ln(1−A
−1
1+y )
+(1− βI)β
y
1−A
−1
1+y
A
−1
1+y
1
(1 + y)2
lnA]
since ∂y∂η = α > 0, we have
∂T
∂η > 0.
While η → 1,T → T (η = 1) = ββI + (1 − β)βI + β(1 − βI) > βI .
When η → 0, T → T (η = 0) = ββI + (1− β)βI
¡
1
A
¢α
+ β(1− βI)
¡
1− 1A
¢α
,
which may be bigger or smaller than βI depending on the value of {α, β, βI}.
When T (η = 0) ≥ βI , then T (η) ≥ βI throughout the domain of η; elsewhere,
T (η = 0) < βI , then there must be a trade-off point
−
η, that when η >
−
η,
T > βI .
Set η∗∗ = max{η∗,−η} ≥ η∗. It must be that T > βI when η ≥ η∗∗.
Dividing (10) by (6), we get
M(T ) =
φB
φI
= (
T
βI
)
α
1−αη(
1− β
1− βI
)
α
1−α (1−η)[
1− αηT − α(1− β)(1− η)
1− αηβI − α(1− βI)(1− η)
]
It is easy to see that ∂M(T )∂T > 0. Thus, for T > βI when η ≥
−
η, we have
φB
φI
=M(T ) > M(βI) = (
1− β
1− βI
)
α
1−α (1−η)[
1− αηβI − α(1− β)(1− η)
1− αηβI − α(1− βI)(1− η)
Denote a = 1−αηβI
1−βI
and r = 1−β
1−βI
. Then M(βI) can be written as a function
of r, that is, L(r) = (a− α(1− η))−1r α1−α (1−η)(a− α(1− η)r). We show that
L(r) is an increasing function of r.
L0 = (a− α(1− η))−1 α
1− α(1− η)r
α
1−α (1−η)−1[a− (1− αη)r] > 0
The last inequality is established
a− (1− αη)r = 1− αηβI − (1− αη)(1− βI)
1− βI
=
αη + βI − 2αηβI
1− βI
> 0
Thus
L(r) > L(1) = 1
As a result, we know
φB > φI when η > η
∗∗
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Proof of Lemma 4
Dividing (10) by (6), we get
φB
φO
=
·
T
β
¸ α
1−αη
"
a− αη Tβ
a− αη
#
= (a− αη)−1s
α
1−αη(a− αηs)
where b = 1−α(1−β)(1−η)β and s =
T
β .
We first show that T > β. To get this, we must have
Aα(1−η)ββI + (1− β)βI + β(1− βI)(A− 1)α(1−η) > βAα(1−η)
⇔
(1− β)βI > (1− βI)β > (1− βI)β[Aα(1−η) − (A− 1)α(1−η)]
the last inequality holds because
Aα(1−η) − (A− 1)α(1−η) < A− (A− 1) = 1
Thus we know s = Tβ > 1. Let L(s) =
φB
φO
= (b−αη)−1s
α
1−αη(b−αηs), we
can have
L0(s) = (b− αη)−1 αη
1− αs
α
1−αη−1[b− (αη + 1− α)s] > 0
The inequality is satisfied because
T < 1⇒ (αη + 1− α)T < (αη + 1− α) + α(1− η)β
so that
L(s) > L(1) = 1
⇒
φB > φO
Derivation of (17)
T (x) = ββI + (1− β)βIxα(1−η) + β(1− βI) (1− x)
α(1−η)
Differentiating T (x) with respect to x, we get
∂T
∂x
= α(1− η)
h
(1− β)βIxα(1−η)−1 − β(1− βI) (1− x)
α(1−η)−1
i
∂2T
∂x2
= α(1− η) [α(1− η)− 1]
h
(1− β)βIxα(1−η)−2 + β(1− βI) (1− x)
α(1−η)−2
i
< 0
33
Setting ∂T∂x = 0, we obtain
x∗ =
1h
β(1−βI)
βI(1−β)
i 1
1−α(1−η)
+ 1
When x > x∗, ∂T∂x < 0 holds; when x < x
∗, ∂T∂x > 0 follows.
Proof of Proposition 4
Define φ(z) = α
α
1−α z
α
1−αη[t(1−β)] α1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α [1−α(ηz+(1− η)(1−
β))], where z = z(x) = ββI + (1 − β)βI (x)
α(1−η) + β(1 − βI)(1 − x)α(1−η).
We first show that φ(z) is an increasing function of z.
∂φ(z)
∂z
= φ
·
αη
1− α
1
z
− αη
1− αηz − α(1− η)(1− β)
¸
= αηφ
α(1− η)β + (1− z) [1− α(1− η)]
(1− α)z [1− αηz − α(1− η)(1− β)] > 0
the last inequality is established as z < 1 (z(x) < ββI+(1−β)βI+β(1−βI) <
1 as x < 1).
Thus comparing φNS with φSS, we have
φSS ≥ α
α
1−α (TNS)
α
1−αη[t(1− β)]
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α [1− α
¡
ηTNS + (1− η)(1− β)
¢
]
≥ φNS
the first inequality is established as T = T (x∗) ≥ T ( 1B ) = TNS (balancing
advantage) and the second inequality is established by the fact that t+B−1B ≥ 1
(cost advantage).
Comparing φSN with φSS, we have
φSS > α
α
1−αT
α
1−αη(1− β)
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α
·
1− α
µ
ηT + (1− η)(1− β)tC − t+ 1
tC
¶¸
≥ φSN
the first inequality is treated as the cost advantage and second inequal-
ity as the balancing advantage. It is easy to see that the second inequal-
ity is established by the fact that the function H(m) = α
α
1−αm
α
1−αη(1 −
β)
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α [1−α(m+(1− η)(1−β) tC−t+1tC ] is increasing in m. While
the first inequality is somewhat complicated that we derive in the following
way.
φSS
H(T )
=
t
α
1−αη[1− α (ηT + (1− η)(1− β))]£
1− α
¡
ηT + (1− η)(1− β) tC−t+1tC
¢¤
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Thus whether φ
SS
H(T ) is bigger than 1 or not depends on whether t
α
1−αη[1 −
α(ηT + (1 − η)(1 − β)] is higher than 1 − α
£
ηT + (1− η)(1− β) tC−t+1tC
¤
or
not. After rearrangement, we have
t
α
1−αη[1− α(ηT + (1− η)(1− β)]−
·
1− α
µ
ηT + (1− η)(1− β)tC − t+ 1
tC
¶¸
= (t
α
1−αη − 1)[1− α(ηT + (1− η)(1− β)]− α(1− η)(1− β)t− 1
tC
> (t
α
1−αη − 1)[1− α(ηT + (1− η)(1− β)]− α(1− η)(1− β)t− 1
t
the last inequality is established as C > 1. Define f(t) = (t
α
1−αη − 1)[1 −
α (ηT + (1− η)(1− β))] and g(t) = α(1 − η)(1 − β) t−1t . It is easy to check
that both these two functions are strictly concave and increasing in t, i.e.
∂f
∂t > 0,
∂2f
∂t2 < 0,
∂g
∂t > 0,
∂2g
∂t2 < 0. Since f(t = 1) = g(t = 1) and f(t =
+∞) > g(t = +∞), we have that f(t) ≥ g(t) for t ∈ [1,+∞). Thus we get
that φ
SS
H(T ) > 1.
Derivation of (18)
It is easy to show that 1A =
h
(1−β)(1−βI)
1+ββI−2β
i 1
1−α(1−η)
is a strictly convex func-
tion of βI , i.e.
∂( 1A )
∂βI
< 0,
∂2( 1A )
∂β2I
> 0, and x∗ = 1h
β(1−βI )
βI (1−β)
i 1
1−α(1−η)+1
is a strictly
concave function of βI , i.e.
∂x∗
∂βI
> 0, ∂
2x∗
∂β2I
< 0. Meanwhile, when βI → β,
we have 1A → 1, x∗ →
1
2
, and thus 1A > x
∗;when βI → 1, we obtain 1A → 0,
x∗ → 1, and hence 1A < x
∗. So, there exists a unique point β∗I = f(β, α, η)
such that when βI < β
∗
I ,
1
A > x
∗ applies and when βI > β
∗
I ,
1
A < x
∗ follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
From equations (11), it is easy to get (hNS,mNS) and (hSS,mSS) as(
hNS = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α (TNS)
α
1−αη+1[t(1− β)]
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α
mNS = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α (TNS)
α
1−αη[t(1− β)] α1−α (1−η)+1(wN)
−α
1−α(
hSS = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−αT
α
1−αη+1[t(1− β)]
α
1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α
mSS = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−αT
α
1−αη[t(1− β)]
α
1−α (1−η)+1(wN)
−α
1−α
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where
TNS = ββI + (1− β)βI
µ
1
B
¶α(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
µ
1− 1
B
¶α(1−η)
B =
·
t(1− β)− β(1− βI)
(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
> 1
T = ββI + (1− β)βI
µ
1
A
¶α(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
µ
1− 1
A
¶α(1−η)
A =
·
1 + ββI − 2β
(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
> 1
Dividing hNS by hSS and mNS by mSS, we get
hNS
hSS
=
µ
TNS
T
¶ α
1−αη+1
and
mNS
mSS
=
µ
TNS
T
¶ α
1−αη
Thus h
NS
hSS and
mNS
mSS are both increasing in
TNS
T . For convenience of expression,
let G denote T
NS
T . Then
∂G
∂t
=
G
TNS
µ
∂TNS
∂t
¶
=
G
TNS
µ
∂TNS
∂B
× ∂B
∂t
¶
As
∂B
∂t
=
B
1− α(1− η)
1− β
t(1− β)− (1− βI)β
> 0
we have
∂G
∂t
∼ ∂T
NS
∂B
∼
·
1
(B − 1)1−α(1−η) −
1
(x∗ − 1)1−α(1−η)
¸
Let H denote 1
(B−1)1−α(1−η) −
1
(x∗−1)1−α(1−η) . It is easy to see
∂H
∂t
= −[1− α(1− η)](B − 1)α(1−η)−2∂B
∂t
< 0
Thus 1
(B−1)1−α(1−η) −
1
(x∗−1)1−α(1−η) is decreasing in t. When t→ 1, B → A <
x∗, then 1
(B−1)1−α(1−η)−
1
(x∗−1)1−α(1−η) > 0 and as a result,
∂G
∂t > 0; when t→∞,
B → ∞, then 1
(B−1)1−α(1−η) −
1
(x∗−1)1−α(1−η) < 0 and as a result,
∂G
∂t < 0. We
therefore conclude that G is first increasing and then decreasing in t.
Since G(t = 1) = 1 and G(t =∞) = βT < 1, we know that G > 1 and thus
(hNS,mNS) > (hSS,mSS) hold when t is not so large and G < 1 and thus
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(hNS,mNS) < (hSS,mSS) hold when t becomes sufficiently large. Given the
complementarity between h and m in the Cobb-Douglas production function
(3), we know that NS achieves a higher level of production efficiency than
SS.
Proof of Proposition 6
We also can get the optimal (hSN ,mSN) from equation (11)(
hSN = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α (TSN)
α
1−αη+1[(1− β)] α1−α (1−η)(wN)
−α
1−α
mSN = ηα
1
1−α (µI)
1
1−αY −
α
1−α θ
α
1−α (TSN)
α
1−αη[(1− β)]
α
1−α (1−η)+1(wN)
−α
1−α
where
TSN = ββI + (1− β)βI
µ
1
C
¶α(1−η)
+ β(1− βI)
µ
1− 1
C
¶α(1−η)
C =
·
(1− β)− tβ(1− βI)
t(1− β)(1− βI)
¸ 1
1−α(1−η)
> 1
1 ≤ t ≤ 1− β
1− βI
Dividing hSN by hSS and mSN by mSS, we get
hSN
hSS
=
µ
TSN
T
¶ α
1−αη+1
µ
1
t
¶ α
1−α (1−η)
, and
mSN
mSS
=
µ
TNS
T
¶ α
1−αη
µ
1
t
¶ α
1−α (1−η)+1
For convenience of expression, let u = 1t and N = T (x(u))
α
1−αη+1u
α
1−α (1−η),
where T (x) = ββI + (1 − β)βIxα(1−η) + (1 − βI)β (1− x)
α(1−η), x(u) =h
(1−β)(1−βI)
u(1−β)−β(1−βI)
i 1
1−α(1−η)
and u lies in the interval of [1−βI
1−β , 1]. Taking loga-
rithm of M , we have
lnN =
µ
α
1− αη + 1
¶
lnT (x) +
α
1− α(1− η) lnu
Thus
∂N
∂u
= N
·µ
α
1− αη + 1
¶
1
T
∂T
∂x
∂x
∂u
+
α
1− α(1− η)
1
u
¸
It has two parts, the second of which is definitely positive. We need to
determine the sign of the first part. As
∂x
∂u
=
−x
1− α(1− η)
·
(1− β)
(1− β)u− (1− βI)β
¸
< 0
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and
∂T
∂x
= α(1− η)
h
(1− β)βIxα(1−η)−1 − β(1− βI) (1− x)
α(1−η)−1
i
The sign of ∂N∂u depends on that of
∂T
∂x . When
∂T
∂x < 0, which happens if u
is low and x < x∗, we have ∂N∂u > 0. In contrast, when
∂T
∂x > 0, which occurs
if u is high and x > x∗, the sign of ∂N∂u is ambiguous. In the following we
consider this latter case, i.e. x > x∗ and ∂T∂x > 0.
Rewrite ∂N∂u as
∂N
∂u
=
N
u
·
α
1− α(1− η) +
µ
α
1− αη + 1
¶
g(u)
¸
where g(u) = uT
∂T
∂x
∂x
∂u
∂g(u)
∂u
=
1
T
∂T
∂x
∂x
∂u
− u
T 2
µ
∂T
∂x
∂x
∂u
¶2
+
u
T
∂2T
∂x2
µ
∂x
∂u
¶2
+
u
T
∂T
∂x
∂2x
∂u2
< 0
as ∂
2T
∂x2 < 0,
∂T
∂x > 0,
∂2x
∂u2 > 0. So
∂N
∂u
≥ N
·
α
1− α(1− η) +
µ
α
1− αη + 1
¶
g(u = 1)
¸
= N
α
1− α(1− η)[1−
1− β
1− β − β(1− βI)
βI(1− β)− β(1− βI)(A− 1)α(1−η)−1
ββIAα(1−η) + (1− β)βI + (1− βI)β (A− 1)
α(1−η) ]
It is easy to see that the expression on the right hand side is bigger than
zero. So ∂N∂u > 0 holds.
Now we know that N is always increasing in u. When u reaches its
maximum, i.e., u = 1, N also reaches the maximum, i.e., Nmax = T
α
1−αη+1.
Under this circumstance, (hSN ,mSN) and (hSS,mSS) are equal. This implies
that when u < 1, N < Nmax and thus (hSN ,mSN) ≤ (hSS,mSS) holds.
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